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Can Emerging Market Bank
Regulators Establish
Credible Discipline?
The Case of Argentina, 1992–99
Charles W. Calomiris and Andrew Powell
5.1 Introduction
Like those of many other emerging-market countries, Argentina’s bank-
ing sector was liberalized in the 1990s. That liberalization followed decades
of severe ﬁnancial repression. The return to deposits placed in banks pre-
viously was substantially negative; according to Central Bank estimates, if
$100 of deposits had been placed in an Argentine bank in 1944, it would
be worth roughly 3 cents in real terms today (and 1 cent in 1990). As re-
cently as 1990, bank deposits were frozenas part of an emergency ﬁscalad-
justment. As elsewhere, liberalization involved lifting controls on interest
rates, deregulating the banking sector, allowing the entry of foreign capital,
privatizing, and adopting international regulatory standards.
Nevertheless, the experience of the Argentine banking sector over the
past decade has been unique in several respects. Many observers view Ar-
gentina’s reforms as among the most radical attempts to overhaul a bank-
ing system. In Argentina credit was traditionally allocated either to the
1471. We note, however, that Chile has since revised and strengthened its capital requirements
on banks.
public sector or, through public intervention, to speciﬁc sectors or projects
in the private sector. Moreover, the banking sector suﬀered from ineﬀec-
tive regulation and supervision, and repeated, forced government rescues
contributed signiﬁcantly to Argentina’s past ﬁscal and inﬂationary prob-
lems. In contrast, many have argued that today there is a credible, restric-
tive safety net as well as high regulatory and supervisory standards. For ex-
ample, as shown in table 5.1, one World Bank study rated Argentina’s regu-
latoryregimeonparwithHongKong,secondonlytoSingapore,andhigher
than the longer-lived and much admired regime in Chile.1 In particular,
the Argentine system is praised for its attempt to introduce elements of
private market discipline as a central component of its regulatory regime.
Private market discipline is enhanced by the following policies: (a) A
strictly limited safety net (comprised of a privately funded, limited deposit
insurance scheme and restrictions on the Central Bank’s potential lender-
of-last resort powers) exposes bank depositors to the possibility of loss.
(b) High and credible minimum risk-based capital requirements further
ensure that stockholders (rather than taxpayers) bear the risk of bank de-
fault. (c) National government programs encourage the privatization of
provincial government-owned banks. (d) A credit rating scheme has been
introduced whereby each bank must solicit a credit rating from an interna-
tionally active rating agency. (e) A subordinated debt requirement man-
dates that banks must issue a subordinated liability for some 2 percent of
deposits each year. (f) Banks must satisfy a liquidity requirement in addi-
tion to the capital requirement. This not only reduces portfolio risk, en-
sures systemic liquidity, and further reduces the potential for taxpayer loss
from failed banks, but also (because of the structure of the requirement)
rewards banks with lower regulatory cost when the market perceives that
their risk of failure is low. (g) The Central Bank publishes basic informa-
tion about bank loans to individuals and ﬁrms that borrow from banks
(which enhances transparency of credit risk). (h) The quality of accounting
data is enhanced by mandatory private audits conducted according to
Central Bank guidelines, and auditors must post a forfeitable bond. (i)
Argentina permits free entry and competition among foreign and domestic
banks, which not only encourages the eﬃcient management of banks but
also enhances the ability of bank depositors to punish weak banks by
moving their funds to stronger institutions.
The Argentine system’s high marks from the World Bank also reﬂect
the fact that the regulatory reforms put in place in the early and mid-1990s
have been tested by external shocks. The banking authorities’ reactions to
those shocks have encouraged advocates of market discipline. Rather than
retreat from the reform process in the face of the tequila crisis of 1994–95,







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.the Argentine authorities redoubled their eﬀorts to ensure that market dis-
cipline prevailed in the banking system. Indeed, many of the features of
the current regulatory system just listed were enacted or strengthened after
the tequila crisis as part of a new plan for bank oversight developed at the
central bank, which is known as the BASIC system of bank regulation.
We deﬁne the key elements of that system, and explain its evolution, in
section 5.2. These include the new liquidity requirement system (replacing
a more traditional reserve requirement approach), capital requirements
that reﬂect banks’ trading risks and banking book interest rate risks, an
expansion of the publicly available database on the condition of bank bor-
rowers, and the minimum mandatory subordinated debt and credit rating
requirement. The authorities have also negotiated a contingent liquidity fa-
cility with international banks in order to inject emergency liquidity on the
basis of Argentine collateral in the case of a sharp, systemic liquidity shock
(this facility currently stands at some $6.45 billion, excluding a $1 billion
World Bank/Inter-American Development Bank [IDB] enhancement).
Also over this period a signiﬁcant amount of foreign capital entered the
banking system such that, at the time of this writing, some 60 percent of
private sector deposits are now in banks under foreign control, accounting
for some 40 percent of the whole system. Only one large (top-eight) private
retail bank that does not have a foreign controlling interest remains.
The only policy reaction to the 1995 crisis that could be construed as a
weakening of the commitment to market discipline was the reestablish-
ment of deposit insurance. The signiﬁcance of this change for market disci-
pline, however, should not be exaggerated. In November 1992 Argentina
abolished its deposit insurance system. When the tequila crisis of 1994–95
hit, Argentina reestablished limited insurance for small deposits, but it did
not retreat on its commitment to market reform by bailing out insolvent
banks. Banks suﬀered large outﬂows of deposits during 1995 (see Banco
Central de la Repu ´blica Argentina [BCRA] 1995 and D’Amato, Grubisic,
and Powell 1997 for an analysis). Although some critics have pointed to
government-assisted acquisitions of banks as a partial bailout of some
institutions, it is important to emphasize that, as we describe in detail later,
several banks were allowed to fail in the wake of the tequila crisis and that
there have been subsequent failures too (see Anastasi et al. 1998). In some
of these cases, depositors and other creditors suﬀered signiﬁcant losses.
During the recent crises in Asia, Russia, and Brazil, Argentina suﬀered
signiﬁcant macroeconomic fallout, and thus bank deposit growth and
credit growth have slowed and interest rates have risen, as shown in ﬁgure
5.1 (which plots deposit growth, the sovereign yield, and an index of eco-
nomic activity). In contrast to some other emerging countries, however,
the weakness of the banking sector has not itself been a source of macro-
economic problems, foreign exchange attack, or capital ﬂight. Indeed, it is
widely perceived that the banking sector as a whole has weathered these














































kstorms extremely well, even though some individual banks have been
weakened. That record has added conﬁdence in the credibility of regu-
lation.
In large part, the apparent success of Argentina’s banks reﬂects unique
circumstances of history and the current political environment. In particu-
lar, Argentina’s experience prior to the 1990s with inﬂation, ﬁnancial re-
pression, large bank rescues, and low quality in terms of banking services
created widespread popular support for the continuation of the currency
board as an inﬂation-ﬁghting tool, a restricted safety net for banks, and
tight ﬁscal discipline. These factors reduced the temptation to bail out
ﬁnancial institutions during the recent crises and also implied that the
authorities could allow a signiﬁcant increase of foreign capital in the sector
without fear of any political or popular backlash. Indeed, one puzzle is
that although the sector was opened signiﬁcantly in 1992, and the rest of
the economy received large injections of foreign capital between 1992 and
1996, it was only in the years 1997 and 1998 that the banking system saw
a very signiﬁcant increase in foreign capital. One hypothesis is that these
international banks waited until the system was tested by its ﬁrst major
external shock before making such signiﬁcant investment decisions.
Despite this record of apparent success, the reforms and transformation
of the banking system have not gone without criticism. Some have sug-
gested that the enactment of limited deposit insurance was unnecessary
and counterproductive; that more institutions should have been allowed to
fail; and that some assisted mergers, particularly during the tequila period,
simply delayed a problem rather than solve it (see World Bank 1998).
Other critics have suggested that Argentina’s banking regulations are too
tight (in particular capital, liquidity, and provisioning) and have dimin-
ished banking sector returns and placed the sector at a disadvantage with
respect to foreign banks. Other criticisms refer to particular regulations.
Some suggest, for example, that a regulatory authority should not establish
requirements for the private rating of banks. Others suggest that the eﬀec-
tiveness of the obligation to issue subordinated debt, and therefore market
discipline, has been reduced because the penalties for noncompliance have
been lowered—a consequence of the perceived diﬃculties of issuing debt
in the wake of the international ﬁnancial crises of 1997 and 1998. Finally,
it has been suggested that the entry of foreign banks may have a drawback;
some perceive foreign banks as having more restricted lending practices
than national banks and blame those lending policies for exacerbating the
current recession.
In this paper we review the record of bank regulation and evaluate that
record from the perspective of evidence on the existence of market disci-
pline. We consider evidence on the question of whether and to what extent
banks have been disciplined by the market. Section 5.2 provides an over-
view of the evolution of the regulatory environment from 1992 to the pres-
152 Charles W. Calomiris and Andrew Powellent as well as an evaluation of its consequences for the structure and per-
formance of banks and their exposure to market discipline. Section 5.3
brings econometric evidence to bear on the extent to which market disci-
pline penalizes risk and constrains bank behavior. Thus, in addition to
evaluating the record of regulatory enforcement in the narrow legal sense,
we also examine the economic evidence that market discipline exists, and
that it has in fact achieved its desired goal of limiting bank risk taking.
Speciﬁcally, section 5.2 summarizes the experiences with privatization,
foreign entry, consolidation, bank failure, and depositor loss. Section 5.3
focuses on diﬀerences in bank deposit interest rate risk premiums and in
deposit growth, with an emphasis on the degree of diversity within the
system with respect to these measures of market discipline. It then devel-
ops a framework for identifying links between fundamentals that aﬀect
bank default risk and market reactions to that risk (as seen through higher
interest rates on deposits and lower deposit growth). Finally, we consider
evidence on the eﬀectiveness of market discipline in constraining bank risk
taking. Section 5.4 concludes.
5.2 The Development of the Regulatory Framework, 1992–99
5.2.1 The Origins of Banking Reform
The economic turbulence of the late 1980s and the hyperinﬂations of
1989 and 1990 virtually destroyed the Argentine ﬁnancial system. M3/
GDP, which stood at almost 50 percent in the 1940s, declined over the fol-
lowing decades and then fell very sharply, reaching a mere 5 percent as of
1990. The ﬁscal reforms of 1989 and 1990 sowed the seeds of the end of
inﬂationary ﬁnancing in Argentina. However, as part of those reforms, the
1989Bonexplan(whichincludedreplacingbankdepositswithBonexbonds
trading at deep discounts) had a signiﬁcant adverse impact on the ﬁnan-
cial system. A path to reform based on the seizure of private property
housed in the banking system does not encourage rapid faith in the safety
of bank deposits.
Nevertheless, since 1990 conﬁdence gradually has returned, and depos-
i t sh a v eg r o w ns t r o n g l y .M 3h a sr i s e na n di sn o ws o m e3 0p e r c e n to fG D P .
Although this is still a low level for a country of Argentina’s GDP per
capita and level of development, this ﬁnancial system growth has been
rapid and reﬂects the transformation of a private banking system that has
resumed its role of allocating credit to the private sector.
Macroeconomic stability returned with the imposition of the April 1991
currency board (enshrined in the Convertibility Law) and a very signiﬁ-
cant opening and further liberalization of the economy, including the
banking system. The legal and regulatory environment in the ﬁnancial sys-
tem was further deﬁned with a new (September 1992) Central Bank char-
Emerging Market Bank Regulators and Credible Discipline 153ter. This established Central Bank independence (as in its 1936 creation),
and recreated the banking superintendency as a semiautonomous unit
within theCentral Bank.The CentralBank hasten full-time directors(pro-
posed by the executive and approved by the senate), including the presi-
dent, vice-president, superintendent, and vice-superintendent of banking
supervision. The Central Bank was given a signiﬁcant degree of autonomy
with respect to banking regulation and supervision (e.g., capital and other
requirements can be changed by a simple decision of the board), but its
role in monetary policy and lender-of-last-resort activities is severely re-
stricted by the 1991 Convertibility Law and 1992 charter.
Table 5.2 lists the main regulatory changes over the period 1992–99. The
period 1992–94 was one of strong economic growth and fast development
of the ﬁnancial system, albeit from a very small base. In this context the
Central Bank worked to impose international capital, accounting, and pro-
visioning standards, and to improve banking supervision. The ﬁnancial
system had lost virtually all deposits, and hence banks were very highly
capitalized—implying that high capital standards were not too diﬃcult to
impose at that time. A minimum of 9.5 percent of assets at risk was the
standard required as of the end of 1992, rising to 11.5 percent from 1
January 1995 (0.5 percent rises were eﬀected every six months). On top of
these requirements, Argentina also introduced a capital requirement for
credit risk, which uses the interest rate charged on each loan as a signal of
credit risk and requires that capital rise accordingly. Actual minimum cap-
ital requirements by the end of 1994 were then some 14 percent of assets
at risk—well above the minimum capital requirements set by the Basel
standards, or those required in other developing economies. Provisioning
requirements were tightened signiﬁcantly at the end of 1994 and through-
out 1995.
Other improvements in banking supervision were underway well before
Table 5.2 Main Regulatory Advances in Argentina, 1991–99
April 1991 Currency board adopted (backing of monetary base and ex rate
10,000:1, subsequently 1:1)
September 1992 New charter of the Central Bank
December 1992 Deposit insurance abolished
1992–94 Basel capital requirements adopted, raised to 11.5 percent at
December 1994
1994–95 Provisioning requirements tightened
April 1995 Limited, fully funded, deposit insurance, $20,000 (subsequently
$30,000)
August 1995 Liquidity requirements system (Raised to 20% of Deposits through
1997)
September 1996 Market risk capital requirements
1997–98 BASIC introduced (B for bonds, C for credit rating, etc.)
March 1999 Capital requirements for interest rate risk
154 Charles W. Calomiris and Andrew Powellthe tequila crisis. In 1992 the Central Bank created a database of the main
debtors of the ﬁnancial system (for loans of more than $200,000). Argen-
tina also maintained a system of high reserve requirements that were
viewed explicitly at the time as a liquidity tool (i.e., both as a means of
limiting asset risk and as a way of protecting the banking system from the
risk of depositor ﬂight). These nonremunerated reserve requirements were
also thought of as a tax on banks. The required reserve ratios were set at
high levels on sight deposits and at low levels on time deposits. That dif-
ferencedidnotreﬂectunderlyingliquidityriskdiﬀerencesbetweentimeand
demand deposits so much as the inelasticity of demand for sight deposits
(i.e., the desire to avoid ﬁnancial disintermediation in reaction to the taxa-
tion of banks). As we discuss later, time deposits actually displayed a
greater withdrawal propensity during the crisis than did demand deposits.
The 1980s left Argentina with a very large number of small ﬁnancial
institutions, many of which disappeared in the 1990s. In the prereform pe-
riod, these institutions had become government ﬁnancing vehicles rather
than a proper means of channeling credit to the productive sectors of the
economy. With macroeconomic stability, low inﬂation, and liberalization,
many such institutions—which lacked the skills to survive in the new envi-
ronment—faced the daunting challenge of transforming themselves into
bona ﬁde competitive providers of credit. Many survived into the 1990s as
they attempted to change their focus. According to one view of that transi-
tion period, the strong economic growth and sharp rises in Argentine asset
prices in the period 1992–94 (at least until the change in direction of U.S.
interest rate policy in February 1994), coupled with high levels of bank
capital, gave a breathing space to many institutions as they attempted to
adapt to the new circumstances. An alternative interpretation of this pe-
riod of economic boom is that it allowed many institutions to survive de-
spite underlying weaknesses that only became apparent in subsequent pe-
riods of stress.
Table 5.3 gives statistics on the number and type of ﬁnancial institu-
tions, as well as on the total size of the system, in Argentina over the
1990s. The table shows that there has been substantial restructuring in the
Argentine ﬁnancial system. From 1980 to 1992 over 250 institutions
closed. While 210 of these were nonbank ﬁnancial institutions, 48 were
banks. Between 1992 and 1994 there was actually relatively little restruc-
turing activity; and although a set of further nonbanks closed their doors,
new banks opened as the system reoriented its focus. Also in this period
the privatization process commenced with three entities privatized. There
was then a second quite ferocious wave of restructuring activity through
1995 (the so-called tequila period), and to a lesser extent this process con-
tinued through 1999. From the end of 1994 to September 1999 over ninety
institutions closed, including ﬁfty-four banks and fourteen nonbanks.
There were also a signiﬁcant number of privatizations (eighteen). As these
Emerging Market Bank Regulators and Credible Discipline 155privatizations were banks transferred to the private sector, the number of
total bank closures (including both private and public banks) was seventy-
two (ﬁfty-four plus eighteen).
5.2.2 The Tequila Crisis
Despite the advances in regulation and supervision in 1992–94, the
events of late 1994 (particularly after the 20 December Mexican devalua-
tion) and early 1995 exposed weaknesses in many institutions. The tequila
period was a very signiﬁcant event for the ﬁnancial system, and as such it
is worth explaining the main events and regulatory response in some detail.
After 20 December a dramatic fall in Argentine asset prices signiﬁcantly
aﬀected the solvency ratios of several wholesale banks with relatively large
government bond portfolios or other ﬁnancial market exposures. At the
same time, because these institutions had only a small amount of sight
deposits, they had little in the way of liquidity reserves at the central bank.
Several such institutions experienced a signiﬁcant loss of deposits and
hence a sharp liquidity crunch. Cooperative and some provincial banks
also fared particularly badly, reﬂecting their low-quality loan portfolios.
Nevertheless, although the ﬁnancial system lost deposits in January and
February, this period could not be described as a systemic panic; larger
retail banks and large public banks gained deposits, and deposits denomi-
nated in dollars also rose overall (see BCRA 1995 and D’Amato, Grubisic,
and Powell 1997 for more details). This phase of the shock was largely a
ﬂight to quality.
The Central Bank responded to these events in a number of ways.
Within the Central Bank was an interesting debate about whether the
problem being faced was a run on the currency, which might require a
tightening of monetary conditions (i.e., a raising of reserve requirements),
or alternatively a liquidity problem, which would require the opposite pol-
icy. In the wake of the monetary contraction and a deteriorating macroeco-
Table 5.3 Structure of the Financial System
1980 1992 1994 September 1999
No. of institutions 469 212 205 119
Private 179 131 135 81
Wholesale n.a. 32 34 31
Retail n.a. 99 101 50
Foreign-owned 27 31 31 48
Public 35 36 33 15
Nonbank 255 45 37 23
Total depositsa 55,020 26,002 42,278 74,693
Note: n.a.  not available.
aIn millions of 1993 pesos.
156 Charles W. Calomiris and Andrew Powellnomic environment, it was soon realized that the greater problem was a
potential banking sector liquidity crisis, rather than a run on the peso.
Hence, reserve requirements were lowered.
The distribution of liquidity within the system was as signiﬁcant a prob-
lem as its aggregate amount. Large retail banks had large reserves in the
Central Bank and gained deposits, whereas wholesale banks had low re-
serves in the Central Bank and were losing deposits. A private liquidity
sharing system was negotiated for the banking system. However, the
amount of liquidity actually circulated via that mechanism was very re-
stricted. Thus, the authorities also set up an obligatory system through an
extra (2 percent) reserve requirement on certain banks, which was then
distributed through the publicly owned Banco Nacio ´n. Finally the Central
Bank extended repos and rediscounts to other aﬀected institutions ac-
cording to the rules laid down in the Central Bank’s 1992 charter.
The end of February 1995 was a critical moment. The Central Bank was
ﬁnding that the rules on providing rediscounts were very restrictive (being
limited to thirty days and to never exceeding the regulatory capital of the
borrowing bank), and on 27 February Congress approved a set of changes.
These modiﬁcations included being able to extend rediscounts for longer
periods and, under exceptional circumstances, for an amount exceeding
the regulatory capital of the bank. Some interpreted these changes as a
weakening of the Convertibility Law itself.
By February Argentina’s ﬁscal position had deteriorated markedly, and
there was no agreement yet in place with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). Argentina had missed an IMF ﬁscal target at the end of 1994, and
the authorities had not agreed to a new program. Finally, the May 14th
presidential election was looming, and it had been agreed that this election
would be fought subject to new electoral rules (a ballotage system) that
created new uncertainty. Opinion polls at the time put Carlos Menem in
the lead but without enough votes to win comfortably in the ﬁrst round,
prompting speculation of potential second-round coalitions. The opposi-
tion parties at the time were not perceived as being strong supporters of
the currency board system, nor the very deep liberalization measures that
had been pursued.
Rumors abounded in this uncertain economic and political climate.
These centered on the state of the banking system and individual banks
and the state of the ﬁscal accounts. A persistent rumor was that the gov-
ernment was considering, as a way out of the crisis, “freezing” bank depos-
its, as had been done in 1989. The deposit runs that had aﬀected mostly
individual banks spread throughout the system, and in the ﬁrst two weeks
of March virtually all banks lost deposits. Indeed, in this two-week period
roughly half of the total $8 billion that left the system ﬂed the country.
This more systemic run was halted in the middle of March with the
signing of a new agreement with the IMF and an international support
Emerging Market Bank Regulators and Credible Discipline 1572. As a caveat it is worth noting that if this model is reestimated over diﬀerent sample
periods, although similar prediction success can be obtained, other bank fundamentals are
preferred. This indicates some potential instability in model speciﬁcation, or an alternative
explanation might be a very ﬂat likelihood function with respect to the diﬀerent model speci-
ﬁcations. The superintendency is now employing the results of this analysis in its oﬀ-site
work.
package with money from the IMF, the World Bank, and the IDB. A pri-
vate bond was also launched (known as the Patriotic Bond, with internal
and external tranches—an early explicit example of “bailing in”). Part of
these funds ﬁnanced two ﬁduciary funds for the banking system: one to as-
sist provinces in the privatization of provincial banks, and one to assist in
the restructuring of the private banking system. Deposits fell slightly from
the day after this agreement was signed until 14 May (the presidential elec-
tion date). After Carlos Menem’s victory in that election, and with much
uncertainty thus resolved, deposits started to grow again, and the ﬁnancial
system recovered very quickly.
Despite the fact that the systemic run of March 1995 aﬀected all the
banks, depositors ﬂed some banks more than others. Schumacher (1997),
Dabo ´s and Sosa-Escudero (2000), and Anastasi and colleagues (1998) all
conclude that banks that failed or were forced to merge over this period
were much weaker institutions. Each of these papers adopts a logit/probit
methodology to explain bank failures as a function of banks’ ex ante ob-
servable characteristics. Although each study is slightly diﬀerent in the
samples of banks used and the precise speciﬁcation of the model, the main
results are consistent across all the studies. Each study reports that in over
90 percent of the cases the model correctly predicts failure or survival.
Thus, although both Type 1 and Type 2 errors are found, they are very
small in number.
Anastasi and colleagues (1998) provide more extensive analysis of mar-
ket discipline of banks using a larger sample of banks, a longer time series,
and a more complete set of models than the other papers. In that paper
logit estimates are presented as well as results for a survival analysis, where
the predicted variable is the number of months a bank is expected to sur-
vive (after December 1994). This is estimated using data as of the end of
1994, and predictions are updated on a quarterly basis. A rather small
subset of bank fundamentals are found to be signiﬁcant explanatory vari-
ables, and these variables correctly predict over 90 percent of banks’ sur-
vival experiences even when the set of predictors is constrained to the pre-
dictingvariables as of December 1994. Little is added to predictive power
when explanatory variables are updated quarterly.2
D’Amato, Grubisic, and Powell (1997) develop a slightly diﬀerent ap-
proach. Here the authors examine whether the amount of deposits lost
during the crisis, on a bank-by-bank basis, could be explained by bank
fundamentals, macroeconomic factors, or contagion. Contagion is deﬁned
158 Charles W. Calomiris and Andrew Powellhere as serially correlated losses across banks that could not be explained
either by macroeconomic inﬂuences or by changes in individual bank
characteristics. This interpretation of signiﬁcant panel time eﬀects (indi-
cating signiﬁcant residual correlation) as potential contagion may over-
state true contagion, because it could also be accounted for by time-
varying coeﬃcients or omitted variables. Nevertheless, what is striking in
this study is that even this potentially overstated measure of contagion
was not the most important inﬂuence on deposit loss. When explicit conta-
gion terms were added (e.g., the loss of deposits of other banks in the
previous time period), additional time eﬀects in the panel analysis became
insigniﬁcant, indicating the importance of serial correlation of risk for
the banking sector as a whole. However, fundamental macroeconomic fac-
tors remained signiﬁcant in generating aggregate risk, and the majority of
the explained variation in deposits was accounted for by bank funda-
mentals, indicating the importance of bank soundness in depositors’ deci-
sions.
Table 5.4 summarizes the eﬀect of the tequila period on the ﬁnancial
system. Between December and May the system lost $8 billion, or 18 per-
cent, of deposits, and the Central Bank lost some $5 billion, or 30 percent,
of international reserves. Over this single year some ﬁfty-one institutions
were closed (twelve liquidated and thirty-nine merged), and two institu-
tions were suspended and subsequently merged in 1996. The total deposits
in liquidated institutions in 1995 amounted to $958 million, and of this
depositors received roughly 50 percent of their investments, losing an esti-
mated $477 million. In addition, other creditors (mainly bondholders) lost
an estimated $249 million. This is a record of market discipline (i.e., actual
depositor loss) that few countries have matched in recent decades. (Inter-
estingly, Estonia in the early 1990s—a country also constrained by its com-
mitment to a currency board—is the only other example of signiﬁcant
depositor loss of which we are aware.)
Table 5.4 The Tequila Crisis
No. of institutions, December 1994 205
Institutions liquidated 12
No. of mergers 39
New institutions 4
No. of institutions, December 1995 158
Institutions suspended and then merged 2
Total deposits in liquidated institutionsa 958
Estimated total loss of depositsa 477
Estimated total loss of other liabilitiesa 249
aIn millions of pesos.
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Argentina had abolished deposit insurance in the early 1990s and man-
aged to weather the tequila storm without it. Nevertheless, there was a
perception among some that the complete absence of deposit insurance
was too extreme and that its absence may have contributed to the ﬂight
from the banking system. A limited deposit insurance scheme was intro-
duced in May 1995 covering deposits of up to $20,000 and funded though
premiums on banks calculated using a risk-based pricing formula. This
insurance scheme was implemented through a government-sponsored en-
terprise—Seguro de Depo ´sitos Sociedad Ano ´nima (SEDESA)—that is
separate from the Central Bank. The scheme has since been extended to
cover deposits up to $30,000.
Originally, SEDESA was seen as a body that would simply pay out to
depositors in the case of a bank liquidation. However, over time SEDESA’s
role and powers have been extended. SEDESA is now formally charged
with a minimum cost resolution objective. Additionally, the charter of the
Central Bank has been altered to allow the Central Bank to separate the
assets and liabilities of a failing bank. In eﬀect, this allows the Central
Bank to create a “good” bank that can then be sold and a “residual bank”
that can be wound up, thus avoiding the liquidation of the whole bank.
The residual bank rests in a “trust” backed by bonds. These bonds are
then bought by private investors, and bonds have also been bought with
SEDESA’s funds—consistent with the minimum cost resolution guide-
lines. In particular cases, for example when the Central Bank had pre-
viously given a rediscount to the bank, the Central Bank has also con-
verted its liabilities into bonds backed by the residual bank trust. Other
resources, administered through the government’s Bank Capitalization
Trust Fund, have also been used essentially to facilitate acquisitions by
other banks.
These innovative mechanisms for resolving problem institutions have
attracted signiﬁcant attention. Critics (see World Bank 1998) have sug-
gested that these policies have weakened market discipline. A further re-
lated concern highlighted in that report is that acquiring banks were not
always of suﬃciently high quality to ensure that the merged institution
had a sustainable future; the World Bank suggested that acquiring banks
should have A credit ratings or even higher. Due to these concerns, the
Central Bank formed a committee including three outside experts to re-
view its policies with respect to bank resolution; implementing the ﬁndings
of that committee became a condition in a World Bank/IDB loan program.
Torre (2000) provides a very useful review of these policies and the relevant
trade-oﬀs.
Thus far, it seems that little in the way of adverse consequences has
160 Charles W. Calomiris and Andrew Powellresulted from the policies just mentioned, and these policies have pro-
duced the tangible beneﬁt of a relatively fast resolution of problem insti-
tutions, at least in more recent cases. It is interesting to note that banks
rated BB have shown a greater probability of being upgraded than down-
graded, and that positive tendency is also reﬂected in the transition proba-
bility matrix of Capital, Assets, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity
(CAMEL) ratings (see BCRA 1999). Moreover, although the law in Ar-
gentina places depositors in a very senior position and makes it diﬃcult
to discriminate between large and small depositors during a liquidation,
depositors have lost money in two out of eighteen banks closed since 1995,
and losses have been experienced commonly by other liability holders, en-
hancing market discipline. Finally, although the resolution process has in
some cases involved the use of Central Bank funds, the Convertibility Law
and the Central Bank charter continue to place strong limits on this activ-
ity and ensure that whatever public assistance there is in terms of bank
resolution would have to be ﬁscal and hence transparent in nature. This
characteristic of the Argentine ﬁnancial system continues to provide
strong incentives for prudent behavior, reﬂected in the banking sector’s
prudence through the recent recession.
Immediately after the tequila shock, beginning in August 1995, there
was a very signiﬁcant reform of the reserve requirement system. During
the crisis it was found that sight deposits were more stable than time depos-
its and that banks with more time deposits had lost a greater fraction of
their deposits and (because of the relatively low reserve requirement on
time deposits) had less liquidity available to them in the Central Bank. It
was decided to replace reserve requirements with a “liquidity require-
ment” acknowledging explicitly that these reserves were intended for “sys-
temic liquidity protection.” These new liquidity requirements were speci-
ﬁed on virtually all liabilities (reserve requirements had been placed only
on deposits) at rates that declined depending on the residual maturity of
each liability and that were required irrespective of the type of liability
(sight deposit, time deposit, bond, etc.). Finally, the liquidity requirements
introduced were remunerated at rates approximately equal to short-term
dollar interest rates, thus alleviating a substantial tax that had been placed
on the ﬁnancial system.
In recent years, the liquidity requirement has been further amended to
permit the holding of balances in qualifying foreign banks to count toward
as much as 80 percent of the requirement, and to permit the use of stand-
bys from foreign banks as a substitute for deposits held abroad. These
rules reﬂect the intent of the liquidity requirement—a means to insulate
the banking system against the ﬂight of deposits—and the recognition that
for that purpose hard currency balances held abroad may be as good as or
better than deposits held at the Central Bank. Furthermore, the ﬂexibility
Emerging Market Bank Regulators and Credible Discipline 161aﬀorded by the use of standbys provides a market reward to low-risk
banks because those banks are able to obtain standbys at low cost from
foreign banks.
Another lesson from the tequila crisis had been the importance of mar-
ket risk as wholesale banks had maintained little regulatory capital against
relatively large government bond positions. In 1996, Argentina became
one of the ﬁrst countries to implement an adapted version of the Basel
market risk capital requirement amendment to the 1988 Accord. Argen-
tina used the “standardized” approach (with simpliﬁed rules for oﬀsetting
positions reﬂecting the more limited Argentine bond market), but with
higher risk weights calculated via a value-at-risk formula. The Central
Bank publishes the volatilities used to calculate these risk weights on a
monthly basis. Capital requirements were further augmented in March
1999 with a requirement to cover interest rate risk on the banking book.
The tequila experience underlined certain structural problems with re-
spect to banking oversight, which encouraged new thinking about the ben-
eﬁts of involving markets in the regulatory process. First, although in large
part standard statistics monitored by the superintendency do a fairly good
job in predicting bank failure, some failures came as a surprise to the
authorities. Among the reasons why banks failed but were not identiﬁed
in advance as problem institutions is that there is a limit to what reported
balance sheet and other statistics tell about a bank. Unsound practices
and fraud are an important cause of bank failure, and one that is not likely
to show itself in reported ﬁnancial ratios. For example, oﬀ–balance sheet
contracts (types of derivative operations) and even undeclared oﬀ-shore
banks were uncovered in the analysis of some institutions that failed dur-
ing the tequila crisis. That observation (along with the evidence that mar-
ket deposit interest rates had been useful in forecasting bank failures dur-
ing the crisis) led policy makers to consider the potential advantages of
relying on market assessments as part of the regulatory process. In an
emerging country context, in particular, where supervisory technology and
resources are relatively constrained, in some cases the market knows more
about the existence of derivatives and oﬀshore transactions than does the
superintendency.
Furthermore, there can also be diﬀerences between the powers and in-
centives of regulators and those of markets to discipline banks. The legal
powers and the legal protection oﬀered to supervisors who attempt to dis-
cipline banks are important issues in some emerging market countries. In
Argentina, for example, legal protection of supervisors is weak (a point
made in World Bank 1998), and the legal tradition does not give much
scope for early Supervisory intervention if an institution is still formally
complying with regulations. There is a possibility, therefore, that supervi-
sors cannot close an institution or force remedial action even if they know
that an institution is facing serious problems. In that case, the market—if
162 Charles W. Calomiris and Andrew Powellit has the correct information—may be more willing and able to discipline
weak institutions than are their supervisors (see Powell 1997 on this point).
5.2.4 The BASIC Approach to Bank Regulation
These kinds of considerations led the regulatory authorities in Argen-
tina to develop what has become known in that country as BASIC banking
oversight (see Powell 1997 and World Bank 1998 for further details). BA-
SIC is an acronym that stands for Bonds, Auditing, Supervision, Informa-
tion, and Credit Rating. The main idea behind BASIC is that both market
and regulatory discipline are imperfect and that there are complementarit-
ies between the two. As we have argued, the superintendency and the mar-
ket may have diﬀerent information sets, incentives, and legal powers; hence
the quality of monitoring can be improved if both are employed actively
to monitor banks. Despite the appeal of the BASIC acronym, the more
logical order to discuss the operation of the system is Information, Au-
diting, Supervision, Bonds, and Credit Rating. Figure 5.2 gives a schematic
representation of the main policies under each heading.
Good information is a prerequisite to either market or regulatory disci-
pline. The superintendency in Argentina publishes summarized bank bal-
ance sheets, principal regulatory ratios, performance ratios, and details of
Fig. 5.2 BASIC system of bank regulation
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capital requirements are adequate. Falkenheim and Powell (1999) use the database and a
simple portfolio model of credit risk in this vein and conclude that in general provisioning
and capital requirements are more than adequate in Argentina given loss probabilities (esti-
mated on data for 1998 and 1999).
the nonperforming loans and provisions on a bank-by-bank basis. More-
over, the superintendency’s credit bureau has been extended to cover virtu-
ally every loan in the ﬁnancial system (all those above $50). The database
includes the name of the borrower and a unique identiﬁcation number
(each person and each company in Argentina has a unique identiﬁcation
number issued by the National Registry and used for many purposes), the
name of the bank extending the credit, the amount of the credit, the quality
category of the loan (the Central Bank has deﬁned a standard categoriza-
tion system from 1  normal to 5  loss), and the details of any guarantees
extended. This information is available free of charge on the Central
Bank’s website debtor by debtor (www.bcra.gov.ar). In other words, any-
one can input the surname of a borrower or a company name and view
instantly the total amount of debt that that individual or company has
with the ﬁnancial system and whether that debt is performing or not.
Measures are taken to ensure that the entire database cannot be down-
loaded. For example, if hundreds of searches are detected from the same
source, further access is denied, essentially in an attempt to protect the
identity of banks’ good creditors from other banks (to ensure that banks
can internalize the beneﬁts of their own screening and monitoring invest-
ments). However, no measures are taken to protect the identity of individ-
ual borrowers. Moreover, the database, except credits of less than $200,000
in categories 1 and 2 (i.e., performing), is sold at very low cost to all inter-
ested parties. The main objectives of this policy are not only to promote
transparency with respect to the borrowers of the Argentine ﬁnancial sys-
tem, but also to enhance the willingness to pay debts, given what is per-
ceived as a weak legal system.3 The database maintained by the superin-
tendency has recently been expanded to include many more variables (e.g.,
basic ﬁnancial ratios of borrowers and other information that would be
relevant for determining the quality of the loan), and these data are also
available for limited private use, although comprehensive current data are
only available for unlimited private use for nonperforming borrowers.
The usefulness of information depends not only on its quantity and
availability but also on its quality. The auditing process is vital to ensure
the validity of the information published. In previous decades in Argentina
auditing ﬁrms have been subject to harsh criticism. In response the Cen-
tral Bank has set up a list of qualiﬁed bank auditors who must post a ﬁ-
nancial bond. In the event of a dispute, this bond may be forfeited, and the
auditor may be struck from the authorized list. Additionally, the Central
Bank lays down strict guidelines on minimum auditing requirements and
supervises the auditing process.
164 Charles W. Calomiris and Andrew Powell4. Argentine capital requirements can be expressed as CR  11.5∗w∗X∗K  MR  IR,
where CR is the Capital Requirement as a percentage of assets at risk, w is the average-bank
Basel risk weight for counterparty risk, X is the average interest rate factor (as described in
the text, the interest rate on each loan is used as an indicator of counterparty risk), K is the
CAMELS factor, MR is the market risk capital requirement and IR is the interest rate risk
(banking book) capital requirement.
5. In this paper we refer to the subordinated debt requirement. In fact, there are several
ways to comply, including issuing a bond or holding a deposit/obtaining a loan from certain
investors. These investors must be from outside Argentina (and subject to a minimum credit
rating) or be local and have already satisﬁed the requirement. In the case of the bond issue,
the bond is not necessarily subordinated to other bonds outstanding, although it is always
subordinate to deposits. Meeting the stronger requirement allows subordinated debt to be
considered as Tier 2 capital.
6. Bond holders can be depended upon to discipline banks in order to limit their risk
taking as long as either (a) equity remains in the bank or, alternatively, (b) an upper limit is
placed on the yield on any subordinated debt that counts toward the regulatory requirement
(which it is not the case in Argentina, and which Calomiris 1997 argues is a weakness of the
current law). For more details, see Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2000).
“Supervision” in BASIC actually refers to both supervision and regula-
tion (and these activities are separated within the internal structure of the
Central Bank). The superintendency has now adopted a version of the
U.S. CAMELS system of bank rating. The banks’ CAMELS ratings are
then used in several regulations. In particular the CAMELS score aﬀects
capital requirements such that banks with poor CAMELS ratings face a
higher requirement.4
“Bonds” refers to the requirement that banks in Argentina must issue a
subordinated liability for some 2 percent of their deposits each year.5 The
idea behind this kind of regulation (as proposed by Calomiris 1997, 1999)
is threefold. First, if banks are forced to attract institutional investors and
to go to market to issue debt, that process reveals information about the
bank to those debt holders and to supervisors. Supervisors may be able to
use that information to discipline the bank. Second, sophisticated inves-
tors who hold a subordinated liability then have incentives to monitor the
bank and are likely to be a constituency for conservatism within the bank
because (like the deposit insurer) their claims are senior to equity. In con-
trast, equity holders in an insured bank that faces large losses may have
incentive to increase risk to take advantage of the put option inherent in
deposit insurance. Thus when equity capital is severely depleted, it is not
a constituency for conservatism.6 Third, if debts are traded publicly, then
the secondary market prices reveal further information about the default
risk of the bank over time. In the case of Argentina, where corporate debt
markets are extremely thin, it was thought that the ﬁrst two objectives
would be more important.
The subordinated debt regulation has not performed as well as its advo-
cates had hoped. The regulation was adopted in late 1996, to become
eﬀective January 1998. However, over this period the Asian crisis struck
global capital markets, and Argentina was also aﬀected (speciﬁcally, after
the speculative attack on Hong Kong in October 1997). Subsequently, Ar-
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countries in Asia were aﬀected, then suﬀered considerably in August 1998
as the result of the Russian debt moratorium, and then was again shaken
by the January 1999 Brazil devaluation. To summarize, from roughly Oc-
tober 1997 to mid-1999, the international ﬁnancial crises made debt or
equity issues (foreign or local) from any issuer (sovereign or corporate) dif-
ﬁcult. The Central Bank reacted to this by putting back the compliance
date for subordinated debt on several occasions, by extending somewhat
the range of liabilities that banks could issue in satisfaction of the require-
ment, and by revising the penalties banks faced for noncompliance.
Currently the regulation remains in force, and banks have a wide range
of liabilities that qualify as subordinated debt. Banks that fail to comply
face higher capital and liquidity requirements. Banks with foreign parents
may comply through their parent.
To investigate how the subordinated debt regulation has been working
in practice, we analyze the characteristics of banks according to how they
have reacted to this regulation. In particular, in table 5.5 we divide banks
into two groups according to whether they have complied with the regula-
tion and how they have complied. In the ﬁrst group we place banks that
either do not have to comply (an exception is made for foreign-owned
banks subject to a minimum credit rating) or have complied by issuing a
bond or obtaining a two-year deposit from a foreign bank. We call this
the high-compliance group. In the second group we place banks that either
have complied weakly by obtaining a two-year deposit from a local institu-
tion (a category that includes some banks that subsequently failed) or have
not complied at all. We designate these low-compliance banks.
The identities of the banks in each of these categories are not a matter
of public information. Some critics have argued that the failure to disclose
that information weakens the power of subordinated debt to provide sig-
nals to the marketplace (i.e., if banks choosing not to comply are weaker,
then revealing that information could facilitate market discipline of those
banks). The decision not to reveal information about bank compliance
reﬂected supervisors’ concerns about creating false impressions of the rela-
tive health of banks during the turbulent period of 1998–99. In particular,
banks that had issued required subordinated debt early (e.g., before the
Asian crisis) did not face the same market challenges as those that had
waited to issue debt, and regulators did not think that relative compliance
always reﬂected relative strength. Nevertheless, that lack of conﬁdence in
the market’s ability to draw proper inferences is somewhat at odds with
the motivations for the law in the ﬁrst place.
Table 5.5 compares various characteristics of these two groups to see if
the banks that comply at a high level are the strongest banks (because one
would expect that banks with lower default risk would have lower costs of
meeting the rigors of market discipline). We report variables that capture
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1993:2–1994 1995 1996–99
Deposit interest rate (US$ deposits)a
High Compliance
Average 6.16 8.47 6.96
Std. Dev. 2.28 5.33 3.45
Low Compliance
Average 6.99 9.98 7.93
Std. Dev. 3.18 7.16 2.76
Loan interest rate (US$ loans)a
High Compliance
Average 15.40 16.69 15.12
Std. Dev. 5.63 6.21 9.29
Low Compliance
Average 19.02 20.70 17.41
Std. Dev. 10.94 11.80 9.70
Change in depositsa
High Compliance
Average 2.43 0.44 5.30
Std. Dev. 36.8 31.8 30.8
Low Compliance
Average 3.58 1.42 4.49
Std. Dev. 14.6 61.2 27.47
Capital ratio (capital integration)a
High Compliance
Average 15.97 17.85 15.70
Std. Dev. 10.85 13.98 12.14
Low Compliance
Average 20.20 17.37 18.31
Std. Dev. 14.55 24.75 16.38
Nonperforming loansa
High Compliance
Average 13.29 16.24 14.16
Std. Dev. 16.04 16.50 12.91
Low Compliance
Average 23.10 30.00 25.44
Std. Dev. 19.25 22.37 17.35
Loans/liquid assets
High Compliance
Average 6.37 6.92 4.16
Std. Dev. 7.52 6.36 4.06
Low Compliance
Average 7.14 9.25 5.39
Std. Dev. 7.93 10.14 8.42
No. of observations
High Compliance 177 237 922
Low Compliance 76 97 412
Note: Low Compliance means either the bank did not comply or the bank complied through
a local subordinated insurance.
aIn percentages.elements of asset risk and liquidity, as well as market perceptions of the
default risk on debt, and the capital ratio.
Default risk on debt is captured alternatively by the average interest cost
on debt for the bank (which reﬂects a market risk premium) and by the
growth rate of deposits. When banks’ deposits are perceived as riskier,
they have a harder time attracting deposits (for theory and empirical evi-
dence on depositors’ aversion to risky deposits, see Gorton and Pennacchi
1990, Calomiris and Kahn 1991, Calomiris and Mason 1997, and Calom-
iris and Wilson 1998).
Asset risk and liquidity diﬀerences are captured by (a) the ratio of loans
to assets (which, ceteris paribus, indicates higher risk and lower liquidity),
(b) the average interest rate on loans (which we view as an indicator of the
riskiness of loans), and (c) the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans
(another indicator of the riskiness of loans). This way of deﬁning elements
of asset risk isolates three perspectives on asset risk: the proportion of
risky assets (loans), the ex ante riskiness of loans, and the riskiness of loans
based on actual performance.
Bank default risk reﬂects a combination of asset risk and leverage. The
inverse of leverage (the capital ratio) is measured here using book values
(the only available measure because virtually none of the banks have pub-
licly traded stock). For the various measures of asset risk, default risk, and
leverage, table 5.5 reports data retrospectively for various dates—that is,
compliance is measured in 1998 and 1999, and data are reported for previ-
ous periods for the groups deﬁned by their recent compliance.
The simple comparisons presented in table 5.5 indicate that banks that
achieved the highest degree of compliance with the rule are relatively
strong, as indicated by deposit growth and deposit interest rate diﬀerences
(the exception is the lack of a diﬀerence in deposit growth rates in the
pretequila period, which predates the subordinated debt regulation by sev-
eral years). Those diﬀerences are also reﬂected in diﬀerences in asset risk,
as measured by loan interest rates, nonperforming loans, and loan-to-asset
ratios. Capital ratios are higher for the banks that comply least with the
law, which reﬂects a combination of their asset weakness (i.e., that risk-
based capital standards are being enforced) as well as the penalty of a
higher capital requirement imposed on banks that fail to comply with the
rule.
Even though not all banks have complied fully with the subordinated
debt rule and there is substantial room for improving the requirement (i.e.,
disclosing compliance and limiting more what qualiﬁes as subordinated
debt), we think the rule can be regarded as a partial success for three
reasons: First, compliance patterns with the rule demonstrate the useful-
ness of market discipline. The fact that weak banks ﬁnd it diﬃcult to issue
subordinated debt, but that strong banks ﬁnd it easy, is encouraging to ad-
168 Charles W. Calomiris and Andrew Powellvocates of the rule who see it as a way to reward banks for gaining the con-
ﬁdence of the marketplace.
Second, banks that fail to comply outright are penalized in ways that
reduce the gains that banks might otherwise obtain from failing to comply,
and that protect against the dangerous moral-hazard problem of risk
taking (so-called asset substitution) in distress states. By being forced to
increase capital and liquidity, noncomplying banks are not encouraged to
increase asset risk easily in the face of weakening in their loan quality,
which protects the deposit insurer and the taxpayer from the risks of ex-
treme loss attendant to the pursuit of “resurrection” strategies.
Third, the law makes clear to all parties that supervisors are aware of
the failure to comply with subordinated debt, and this has the beneﬁto f
enhancing discipline over supervisors. When a weak bank with a long re-
cord of failure to comply with the subordinated debt rule fails, supervisors
cannot claim to have been unaware of the bank’s weakness, because the
market was providing a clear signal of its lack of conﬁdence in the bank.
Although market yields on debt issues are one form of signal, the failure
to issue subordinated debt is arguably an even stronger one because it
indicates that banks would have a very diﬃcult time attracting uninsured
long-term debt. The presence of the subordinated debt rule thus eliminates
ex post plausible deniability for supervisors—they cannot claim to have
been ignorant about bank weakness if that weakness is known in the mar-
ketplace.
Finally, the C in BASIC refers to the credit rating requirement. The
idea of this requirement is also to improve information regarding ﬁnancial
institutions. Whereas the subordinated debt requirement looks to institu-
tional investors to provide discipline and information, the idea of a credit
rating is to ensure that public information is available to less-sophisticated
investors. As in the case of the subordinated debt rule, however, this regu-
latory requirement has not proved to be free of problems.
The Central Bank ﬁrst required banks to obtain credit ratings and per-
mitted the ratings to be produced by any of a set of authorized agencies,
which included local and internationally active agencies (eight in all).
However, the perception was that this regime was expensive and that the
ratings were of varying quality. In other words, there was a perception
that some agencies were giving higher ratings than others. Arguably this
reﬂected the fact that local capital markets are still not highly developed;
Argentina may currently lack a set of institutional investors capable of
providing rating agencies incentives to be conservative.
The Central Bank initially responded to the problem of questionable
ratings quality by issuing standardized guidelines for rating agencies to
follow. This did not appear to solve the problem. Finally, the Central Bank
asked banks to have only one rating (reducing the cost of the regime) but
Emerging Market Bank Regulators and Credible Discipline 1697. These agencies are, in alphabetical order, Duﬀ and Phelps, Fitch-IBCA, Standard &
Poor’s, and Thompson Bankwatch.
8. There have also been a number of privatizations of municipal banks that we do not
report here.
also restricted the authorized agencies to only internationally active ones.
Currently there are four authorized rating agencies.7 We show in table 5.6
an estimated transition probability matrix of ratings over the history of
this regulation. The table illustrates the distribution of current and past
ratings as well as the probability of obtaining a particular current rating
given a particular previous rating. Table 5.6 shows that most banks enjoy
fairly high private ratings. The vast majority of banks rated (89 out of 103)
currently enjoy investment-grade ratings (BBB or higher), and 45 banks
are rated AA or AAA. There have been signiﬁcant changes in ratings for
individual banks in both directions during 1998, three of which placed
banks that had been rated BB, BBB, and A into the F category. The evi-
dence of such dramatic, negative changes in ratings suggests that the rat-
ings are a meaningful signal of quality.
5.2.5 Banking System Structure and Performance
There have also been extremely important structural changes in the Ar-
gentine ﬁnancial system since the tequila crisis; these have been facilitated
by the policies of permitting free entry and encouraging the privatization
of public banks. First, the consolidation process begun in the early 1990s,
and accelerated by the tequila crisis, has continued, as shown in tables 5.3
and 5.4. As mentioned earlier, some of these mergers were assisted through
the use of the ﬁduciary fund set up during 1995 with funds from multilat-
eral institutions and some through the use of funds from SEDESA (the
deposit insurance agency). Moreover, there was also a strong tendency
toward privatization in the banking sector, visible in table 5.7. Some seven-
teen of the twenty-four provincial banks that have been privatized were
assisted through a ﬁduciary fund set up with the assistance of the multilat-
erals (see appendix).8 Privatizations have occurred via a mixture of types
of sales and have largely been to existing domestic banks or domestic in-
vestment groups. Two very large public banks remain in Argentina—
Banco Nacio ´n, owned by the federal government, and Banco de la Provin-
cia de Buenos Aires (the largest Argentine province in terms of GDP)—
and eﬀorts to privatize them have met signiﬁcant political resistance. As
of July 1999, these two banks represent some 27 percent of banking system
deposits. Although former President Carlos Menem expressed his desire
to privatize Banco Nacio ´n in his second term, this was not approved by
congress. The ex-governor of the province of Buenos Aires (Eduardo Du-
halde) and his successor (Carlos Ruckhauf) have not come out in favor of
privatizing its important provincial bank at the time of this writing.
































































































































































































































































































































































































.9. There has also been a tendency among some banks to oﬀer bank accounts combined
with lotteries, free computers, and other domestic appliances, and even airline tickets. These
marketing campaigns may, of course, reﬂect an immature market rather than real competi-
tion. Still, we note that relative to international standards, banking services in Argentina
tend to be expensive; bank administration costs tend to be high; nonperforming loans tend
to be high; and bank proﬁtability is low.
The other very signiﬁcant structural change in the banking system has
been the entry of foreign capital. During 1996–98 several signiﬁcant trans-
actions took place and resulted in the purchase of domestic banks by
Spain’s Banco Santander and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, the United King-
dom’s HSBC, and Canada’s Bank of Nova Scotia (Scotia International),
to name a few. Table 5.8 provides ﬁgures on speciﬁc transactions. Further-
more, Banco Itau from Brazil entered as a start-up and subsequently pur-
chased a local bank. These entrants added to several existing foreign
banks, including Citibank, Bank of Boston, ABM Amro, and Lloyds. De-
posits in banks with a foreign controlling share now account for some 60
percent of private sector deposits and some 40 percent of total deposits.
Foreign banks have heightened competition, and this is most visible in
their strong advertising campaigns and, in some products, in their willing-
ness to wage price wars.9 Foreign competition has also allowed the intro-
duction of new technology, probably more rapidly than otherwise would
have occurred, and has assisted in creating a much more stable deposit
base.
To a large extent, this entry of foreign capital in the banking sector is
simply a reﬂection of what has happened in the Argentine economy more
generally. In fact, the puzzle is really why this did not happen earlier, given
that the sector was liberalized in 1992. As noted before, one hypothesis is
that foreign investors were waiting to see that the new policy regime was
fully tested before making signiﬁcant investments. It is worth noting that
investors in the ﬁnancial system were unusually late in entering compared
to investors in telephones, electricity, gas, water, railways, mining, and pet-
rochemicals. That diﬀerence in timing suggests that potential bank inves-
tors had speciﬁc policy concerns that did not aﬀect other sectors. In partic-
Table 5.7 Bank Privatization in Argentina
Depositsa Assetsa
Number of
Institutions Before After Before After
1992–94 3 1,128 321 562 498
1995–96 11 3,093 1,993 1,706 1,316
1997–99 4 1,442 1,078 1,004 793
Total 18 5,663 3,392 3,273 2,606
aAssets and deposits after and before privatization, in millions of pesos.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2ular, they may have wished to see proof that the government respected the
independence of the Central Bank as a regulator and a monetary agency,
and that the government would not appropriate resources from the bank-
ing sector during a period of stress—e.g., by freezing deposits, as had been
done in 1990. According to that interpretation, after the tequila test these
investors were more willing to come in.
Despite the dynamism in Argentine banking, bank proﬁtability remains
very low by international standards, which partly is a result of regulations
that create incentives for banks to limit their risk and partly reﬂects the
high operating costs of banks in Argentina. Table 5.9 gives a breakdown of
the proﬁtability of the Argentine banking system in the last three years for
public banks, private banks, and the top ten private banks. Even in the top
ten privatebanks, itcan beseen thatcosts remainhigh (almost6 percentof
assets), and although service income is relatively high, loan-loss charges
are also high (at around 2 percent of assets this year), reducing proﬁts to
less than 1 percent of assets. Private banks gradually are less proﬁtable
(0.5 percent of assets) with higher operating costs (6.4 percent of assets),
and public banks show lower interest margin (3.5 percent of assets as op-
posed to 4.5 percent for the top ten private banks). Public bank proﬁtabil-
ity also remains low at 0.4 percent of assets.
The combination of low earnings and high recent acquisition prices is
interesting. Projecting current levels of proﬁts into the future would appear
not to justify the prices paid for recent acquisitions. Thus, in order to
explain these prices, one would have to assume a high forecasted growth
rate for the ﬁnancial system. If those growth forecasts do not materialize,
it is possible that some foreign entrants may reassess their decisions to
enter the Argentine market in the years to come (we note in passing the
decision of Deutsche Bank to sell its Argentine retail business to Bank of
Boston as an example of foreign exit). On the other hand, if high growth
rates resume, the foreign acquisitions of the 1990s could prove quite suc-
cessful.
What are the prospects for further improvement in the structure and
performance of the Argentine banking industry, and what are the risks
posed to the system from delaying those improvements? The World Bank
(1998) report suggests that the problems of the remaining weak private
institutions and the remaining public institutions are quite distinct, and
that neither is a systemic threat or a cause for urgent concern. The World
Bank (1998) suggests that the weaker private institutions—because of
their relatively small size—pose no threat to the stability of the ﬁnancial
system more generally. The remaining public banks, it was argued, also
present no threat to the system (because of their separateness from the
private sector) but might well present signiﬁcant ﬁscal cost if they were to
be privatized today (presumably the authors had in mind a signiﬁcant
clean-up of the public banks’ balance sheets).















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.10. Some observers argue that market discipline is undesirable because it reduces the
supply of credit during downturns and thus exacerbates recessions. We see that eﬀect as
unavoidable, and attempts to mitigate market discipline with regulatory forbearance as
counterproductive. When regulators forbear—in order to permit banks to undertake greater
risk than the market would permit—some (especially insolvent) banks will abuse forbearance
by undertaking enormous risk as part of a resurrection strategy. These bets (e.g., in foreign
exchange markets) often have large negative expected returns and produce enormous losses
to taxpayers. Indeed, the credit contraction attendant to a banking collapse, and the ﬁscal
costs of ﬁnancing those bailouts—both of which are apparent in Mexico recently—can pro-
duce a much worse cyclical drag on the economy than can market discipline on banks. For
further discussion of these macroeconomic costs, see Caprio and Klingebiel (1996).
In the eyes of investors, the reforms in the ﬁnancial system in the late
1990s appear to have produced a very clear positive result. From 1996 to
1998, the ﬁnancial system grew very strongly, with deposits growing at a
roughly 30 percent annualized rate. In the second half of 1998 and through
1999, however, Argentina fell into a recession due to the combination of
external factors (high international lending spreads for emerging econo-
mies, sharp falls in commodity prices, a high value of the dollar, and a
recession in Brazil) and internal factors (political uncertainty leading up
to the October 1999 presidential election). That recession has taken its toll
on the banking system. Although deposits have kept growing (at just over
10 percent for the year), credit to the private sector has grown very little
over the last eighteen months, and interest rates have generally risen, de-
pending on the subperiod analyzed. Nonperforming loans have also risen
quite signiﬁcantly, and thus proﬁtability has suﬀered.
Although the past year has been a very diﬃcult time in some sectors of
the real economy, the banking sector has been very stable. Indeed, the fact
that credit supply has tightened in the face of a recession and high loan
losses is precisely what one would expect from a banking system subject to
market discipline. In that sense, tight credit supply is a sign of the ﬁnancial
system’s strength (Calomiris and Wilson 1998).10 There has been no capital
ﬂight from the banking system whatsoever and no capital ﬂight from the
country (reserves, in fact, have risen). Thus, the ﬁnancial system, which
had always been an Achilles’ heel for Argentina, has recently contributed
to the long-run credibility of ﬁscal, monetary, and regulatory policy, and
thus despite the tightness of credit has contributed to macroeconomic sta-
bility.
As table 5.10 shows, the reaction by Argentine bank depositors to the
recent period of emerging market upheaval (as measured by deposit
growth) is strikingly diﬀerent from the tequila period, even though the
recent upheaval (in Brazil) has had larger fundamental consequences for
the Argentine economy than did the collapse of the Mexican peso in 1994–
95. Not only have deposit growth and international reserves growth re-
mained strong, but interest rates as well have not risen by nearly as much
as they did during the tequila period.
176 Charles W. Calomiris and Andrew Powell5.3 Is Market Discipline Real? Microeconomic Evidence
In this section we take a more formal look at the evidence that market
discipline operates on Argentine banks. We deﬁne market discipline as
reactions of private debt holders to bank actions such that the bank is
penalized for increasing the default risk on its debt, either by a higher risk
premium on debt, or by the withdrawal of debt.
There is now a large empirical literature summarizing evidence on the
existence of market discipline in banking in a variety of contexts. In the
United States, that literature focuses on the usefulness of certiﬁcate of
deposit yields for predicting bank problems (Baer and Brewer 1986; Ber-
ger, Davies, and Flannery 1998; Flannery 1998; Jagtiani, Kaufman, and
Lemieux 1999; Morgan and Stiroh 1999), whereas in developing countries
the empirical focus is on the predictability of deposit interest rates and the
contraction of deposits (Peria and Schmukler 1999). Calomiris and Mason
(1997) and Calomiris and Wilson (1998) show that during the interwar
period in the United States weak banks (measured either by their proba-
bility of failure or by their implied risk of default on debt from an asset-
pricing model) were forced to pay higher interest and suﬀered larger de-
posit outﬂows than did other banks.
As we mentioned earlier, several studies of the recent Argentine experi-
ence have linked ex ante bank risk with ex ante interest charges and deposit
outﬂows, and ex post bank failure (Schumacher 1997; Dabo ´s and Sosa-
Escudero 2000; Anastasi et al. 1998; D’Amato, Grubisic, and Powell
1997). Banks with high deposit interest rates and high observable asset
risk were more likely to fail during the tequila crisis and afterward, and lost
a greater proportion of deposits than other banks. Thus there is already
substantial evidence of the operation of market discipline within the Ar-
gentine banking system.
Our approach to measuring market discipline focuses on links between
observable characteristics of banks (related to asset risk and leverage) and
market reactions to those characteristics as captured in market pricing of
deposit risk and contractions in the volume of deposits. A banking system
in which market discipline is an important constraining force on bank risk
taking should display three characteristics. First, market measures of, and
Table 5.10 Comparison of Two Crises
October 1997
Tequila to February 1999
Deposits growth 18% 19%
Reserves growth 30% 14%
Maximum rise in interest ratesa 12.1 7.9
aPercentage points increase.
Emerging Market Bank Regulators and Credible Discipline 177reactions to, deposit default risk should vary across banks. In a banking
system in which depositors do not distinguish among banks, market disci-
pline is unlikely to exist. Second, diﬀerences in deposit interest rates and
deposit growth across banks should reﬂect diﬀerences in bank asset risk
and leverage, which, according to economic theory, should be the sources
of deposit default risk.
Third, depositor discipline should constrain default risk on deposits.
Recent models of banking that emphasize either the liquidity services of
bank deposits (as in Gorton and Pennacchi 1990) or delegated monitoring
of bank borrowers (as in Calomiris and Kahn 1991) emphasize that depos-
itors do not simply price default risk, but also act to limit it. That is, bank
depositors are not only risk-averse, but also risk-intolerant (Calomiris and
Wilson 1998). As the level of default risk on deposits increases, deposits
become less liquid, and the agency problems inherent in delegated moni-
toring become magniﬁed. Both of these problems lead to a type of quan-
tity rationing in which depositors withdraw their deposits from risky
banks, which acts as a source of discipline over bank risk taking. These
arguments imply that increases in default risk caused by adverse shocks
to bank asset risk and capital should be mean reverting. Banks that suﬀer
those shocks face a strong incentive to reduce asset risk or increase capital
to avoid disciplinary withdrawals of funds by depositors.
Our discussion of microeconomic evidence has three parts. First, we
begin by summarizing the evidence on the extent of cross-sectional hetero-
geneity in the banking system, paying special attention to the heterogene-
ity in deposit interest rates and ﬂows (our measures of market discipline)
during diﬀerent subperiods. Second, we test a model that relates these two
market discipline measures to bank leverage and asset risk measures. That
is, according to ﬁnance theory (e.g., the Black-Scholes model) default risk
should be an increasing function both of asset risk and leverage. In light
of that theory, we test to see whether our panel dataset displays observable
links that conﬁrm the presence of market discipline in bank debt markets.
Third, if depositors are risk-intolerant, then increases in deposit interest
rates in response to increased risk should be reversed over time as banks
are forced to reduce asset risk and leverage to meet depositors’ preferences
f o rl o wr i s k .A saﬁrst step to testing that theory, we provide some simple
tests of mean reversion in deposit interest rates.
5.3.1 Market Discipline and Bank Heterogeneity
Tables 5.11–5.14 provide summary statistics for our measures of asset
risk, default risk, leverage, and deposit growth. These are provided for
separate subperiods and for diﬀerent sets of ﬁnancial institutions. Interest
rates on loans and deposits are measured in these tables as premiums over
the rates of a benchmark, low-interest rate group of foreign retail banks in
order to facilitate a comparison of spreads across subperiods. Our measure






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.of deposit interest rates uses interest rates on dollar-denominated deposits
to avoid problems from mixing peso-denominated and dollar-denominated
debts. Dollar deposits consistently earn lower interest because the peso
trades at a forward discount.
The main usefulness of these tables is to (a) indicate the extent of hetero-
geneity in the reactions of markets to banks (deposit growth and deposit
interest rates);(b) describethe average changesover timein measuresof as-
set risk, leverage, deposit growth, and deposit risk premiums; and (c) ex-
plore links over time between average bank asset risk and leverage, on the
one hand, and average deposit growth and default risk premiums on debt,
on the other. A perusal of these tables clearly indicates the pronounced het-
erogeneity in deposit interest rates and deposit growth, the variation in
average performance over time (reﬂecting the tumult of the 1990s), and
the correspondence among measures of asset risk, leverage, deposit inter-
est rates, and deposit growth. We return to those connections among asset
risk, leverage, and market discipline in our regression analysis later.
These tables also provide some evidence on how links among asset risk,
leverage, and market discipline diﬀer across types of institutions. For ex-
ample, to the extent that public banks are protected from the risk of insol-
vency by their sponsoring governments, depositors in those public banks
may not penalize asset risk and leverage as much. If that were true, then
public bank weakness would not be as evident in deposit interest rate pre-
miums or in lower deposit growth. The tables lend some support for that
view. Note, for example, that during the tequila crisis (table 5.12), nonper-
forming loan ratios for public banks were very high, but deposit interest
rates remained very low.
5.3.2 Fundamental Determinants of Market Assessments
of Bank Liability Risk
Next, we turn to a regression analysis of market discipline as a reaction
to deposit risk, as measured by either the interest rate on deposits or the
outﬂow of deposits. The basic model regresses either of these two depen-
dent variables on our three measures of asset risk (loans/other assets, non-
performing loans/loans, and the loan interest rate), a measure of the liquid-
ityofnonloanassets(cash/governmentbonds),andthe(book)capitalratio.
We used lagged capital ratios to avoid correlation by construction between
deposit growth and the capital ratio. Other independent variables are
taken as exogenous within the quarter in which deposit growth or deposit
interest rates are set.
We report a variety of regression speciﬁcations, including ordinary least
squares (OLS), ﬁxed ﬁrm and time eﬀects, and random eﬀects. We ran the
regressions for diﬀerent time periods and for diﬀerent samples (sometimes
including all banks, sometimes conﬁning the sample to private commercial
Emerging Market Bank Regulators and Credible Discipline 183banks). Our results were generally robust to alternative speciﬁcations, al-
though results were stronger when we restricted our sample to private
commercialbanks. Therestrictionsimposed byrandomeﬀects (theorthog-
onality of regressors with ﬁrm and time eﬀects) passed Hausman’st e s ti n
some cases, and in those cases, random-eﬀects estimation is more eﬃcient.
In tables 5.15 and 5.16 we report a subset of our results for the deposit
growth and deposit interest rate regressions. Speciﬁcally, we report OLS,
ﬁxed eﬀects, and random eﬀects speciﬁcations for the restricted sample of
private commercial banks for the entire period.
Both deposit growth and deposit interest rates reﬂect fundamental
cross-sectional diﬀerences in our measures of asset risk. Higher asset risk
and leverage are associated with depositor discipline in the form of greater
deposit withdrawals, and high asset risk is also reﬂected in higher interest
rates on deposits.
Not all measures of asset risk have the predicted impacts on interest
rates and deposit growth in the regressions. The loan interest rate and loan
ratio enter signiﬁcantly and with the right sign in all regressions, whereas
nonperforming loans and the ratio of cash to government bonds are either
insigniﬁcant, or (in the case of the nonperforming loans) switch signs
across speciﬁcations.
Table 5.15 Panel Regression Analysis of Bank Deposit Growth Rates, Sample





Variables (1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.018 0.018 0.042
(0.019) (0.031) (0.027)
Lagged capital ratio 0.296 0.326 0.277
(0.064) (0.087) (0.074)
Loan interest rate 0.418 0.190 0.254
(0.106) (0.153) (0.121)
Loans/other assets 0.0047 0.0028 0.0032
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Cash/government bonds 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Nonperforming loans/loans 0.059 0.025 0.060
(0.051) (0.079) (0.060)
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.325
p-value for Hausman Test 0.309a
No. of observations 1,138 1,138 1,138
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
aThe restrictions of the random-eﬀects model are not rejected, implying that the random-
eﬀects estimator is preferred.
184 Charles W. Calomiris and Andrew PowellTable 5.16 Panel Regression Analysis of Bank Deposit Interest Rates, Sample





Variables (1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.036 0.060 0.058
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Lagged capital ratio 0.035 0.009 0.019
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Loan interest rate 0.142 0.086 0.101
(0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
Loans/other assets 0.00085 0.00034 0.00046
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00007)
Cash/government bonds 0.00002 0.00000 0.00000
(0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Nonperforming loans/loans 0.038 0.0205 0.007
(0.006) (0.0079) (0.007)
Adjusted R2 0.269 0.638
p-value for Hausman Test 0.000a
No. of observations 1,138 1,138 1,138
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
aThe restrictions of the random-eﬀects model are rejected, implying that the ﬁxed-eﬀects
estimator is preferred.
Interestingly, the eﬀect of the capital ratio is of the expected sign for
deposit growth (positive); but contrary to our expectation, it is also posi-
tive (sometimes insigniﬁcantly) for the deposit interest rate. One way to
explain the diﬀerences in the capital ratio eﬀect between tables 5.15 and
5.16 is to recall that capital ratios are an endogenous variable chosen by
the bank. Even though the capital ratio is lagged (to mitigate the endogen-
eity problem) it is possible that banks anticipate interest rate changes in
their deposits one quarter ahead and alter capital ratios to compensate for
anticipated increases in default risk.
5.3.3 Does Market Discipline Encourage Prudent Risk Management?
The regressions reported in tables 5.15 and 5.16 do not describe banks’
dynamic responses to market discipline. For example, the regressions do
not examine whether increases in default risk on debt produce reductions
in loan-to-asset ratios, or loan risk, or increases in the ratio of cash to
bonds. To accomplish this result, one would have to specify a dynamic
system of equations (possibly, a panel vector autoregressive [VAR] model),
which requires strong assumptions about the relative endogeneity, and the
adjustment frequencies, of our various measures of asset risk, deposit risk,
deposit growth, and capital accumulation. We have already argued that
Emerging Market Bank Regulators and Credible Discipline 185this is treacherous ground; for example, our initial assumption about the
exogeneity of capital ratios to interest rate changes is suspect (especially
given our ﬁndings of a positive partial correlation between deposit interest
rates and capital ratios in table 5.16).
Although we think a panel VAR approach to this problem may be
promising in future research, here we pursue a simpler approach. We ex-
amine whether there is a tendency for individual banks’ deposit interest
rates to revert to their mean, and whether the speed of mean reversion has
changed over time. If depositor discipline forces banks to react to in-
creases in their debt default risk, then high levels of default risk should
prompt reductions in interest rates in the future. We test that proposition
using a simple model of the time series properties of individual banks’ in-
terest rates, and we report our results in table 5.17.
The ﬁxed eﬀects approach to examining mean reversion holds ﬁrm and
time eﬀects constant and constrains all banks to react similarly to changes
in their deposit interest rates. Alternatively, we also estimated the relation-
ship using a random-coeﬃcients approach, which takes advantage of the
opportunity to see whether banks diﬀer in the extent to which their deposit
interest rates revert to the mean. As the results for these two models were
quite similar, we only report the ﬁxed-eﬀects results in table 5.17.
As we discussed at length earlier, regulatory and supervisory monitoring
and discipline have improved markedly in Argentina over the period 1992–
99. In table 5.17, we investigate whether the speed of mean reversion has
increased over time. Speciﬁcally, we report results for several subperiods
(1993:3 to 1994:4, 1995:1 to 1996:2, 1996:3 to 1997:4, and 1997:4 to
1999:1).
The regression we run for each subperiod is rit  c 	 rit1  bi  ft
 εit, where r is the change in the liability interest rate, b and f are ﬁxed
ﬁrm and time eﬀects, and ε is an error term. The i and t subscripts refer
to individual banks and time; 	, which we expect to be negative, measures
the speed at which the interest rate mean-reverts. If interest rates revert by
Table 5.17 Fixed-Eﬀects Regressions: Deposit Interest Rate Mean Reversion (dependent
variable: change in deposit interest rate)
1993:3–1994:4 1995:1–1996:2 1996:3–1997:4 1997:4–1999:1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ri, t1 1.04 1.06 1.04 1.29
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Adjusted R2 0.475 0.450 0.545 0.577
No. of observations 989 791 762 688
Notes: Data are from quarterly observations of all ﬁnancial institutions, 1993:3–1991:1. All regressions
include ﬁxed ﬁrm and time eﬀects, which are not reported here. ri, t1 is deﬁned as the lagged deposit
interest rate for each bank. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
186 Charles W. Calomiris and Andrew Powell11. We also ran regressions excluding ﬁxed ﬁrm eﬀects, which constrains all ﬁrms to target
the same long-run average level of interest rates. Fixed eﬀects have a great deal of explanatory
power (raising the adjusted R2 substantially in all subperiods), and so we only report ﬁxed
eﬀects results in table 5.17. In speciﬁcations without ﬁxed eﬀects, coeﬃcients on the lagged
interest rate were smaller, but the same pattern of increasing coeﬃc i e n ts i z eo v e rt i m ea p -
peared and was even larger in magnitude than the diﬀerences reported in table 5.17.
100 percent in just one quarter, then we expect the 	 coeﬃc i e n tt ob e1;
if there is no reversion at all, then we expect the 	 coeﬃc i e n tt ob e0 .
We then compare the distribution of the 	 coeﬃcients (across banks) for
the subperiods.11
We ﬁnd that mean reversion is rapid. Within-ﬁrm mean reversion occurs
within one quarter (	 is 1 or smaller) in all subperiods. The most recent
period, which has witnessed the implementation of the BASIC plan, shows
a signiﬁcantly higher rate of mean reversion (a coeﬃcient value of 1.29),
which is consistent with the view that banks face stronger incentives to
resolve problems of high default risk in the more recent period. It is diﬃ-
cult to interpret a coeﬃcient size less than 1 (which seems to imply
greater than mean reversion of interest rates). In speciﬁcations without
ﬁxed time eﬀects, coeﬃcient sizes tended to be smaller (typically in the
range of 0.6 to 0.8). Thus we suspect that correlation between average
time eﬀects and individual banks’ sensitivities to aggregate shocks may
explain the apparent overadjustment of rates.
To summarize our empirical results, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant cross-sectional
diﬀerences in market reactions to bank default risk (as measured by de-
posit interest rates and deposit growth), and our regressions indicate links
between those measures and fundamental characteristics of banks related
to asset risk and leverage. Furthermore, deposit interest rates revert to the
mean very quickly (holding ﬁxed eﬀects and time eﬀects constant), and
the rate of mean reversion has increased during the period in which the
BASIC framework was implemented. Overall, these results suggest that
market discipline is present in measuring bank risk, punishing it, and suc-
cessfully encouraging banks to pursue risk-management policies that re-
duce risk after they suﬀer risk-increasing shocks.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we reviewed the Argentine experience in the 1990s with
bank regulatory reform, which has been one of the most determined
eﬀorts, among emerging market countries, to inject credible market disci-
pline into the relationship between banks and depositors, and into the
regulatory and supervisory process. We have argued that Argentina suc-
cessfully implemented a system of bank regulation that achieved credible
market discipline over banks. Markets, as well as regulators, punish or
reward banks depending on the perceived risk of bank failure, and market
Emerging Market Bank Regulators and Credible Discipline 187perceptions of risk (as indicated in deposit interest rates and deposit ﬂows)
are correlated both with ex ante measures of fundamental asset risk and
with ex post incidences of bank failure. Market discipline encourages
rapid, risk-reducing adjustments by banks to shocks that raise their risk
of failure.
Despite these favorable ﬁndings, clearly there is room for improvement
in Argentina’s bank regulation regime. First, the privatization of public
banks remains unﬁnished—most notably in the cases of the two largest
public banks, which account for more than a quarter of banking system
deposits. Second, the least-cost resolution mandate that has been given
SEDESA thus far has not proved very costly, but it could become a slip-
pery slope—a means to pay for implicit bank bailouts, and thus under-
mine the hard-won gains of market conﬁdence and market discipline. Lim-
its to the subsidization of acquisitions that prevent least-cost resolution
from becoming an implicit bailout mechanism are, therefore, a potentially
important area for reform. Finally, the subordinated debt law could also
be improved. Disclosing banks’ compliance with the law seems a desirable
ﬁrst step. Placing greater limits on what qualiﬁes as compliance (in partic-
ular, excluding domestic interbank deposits from the deﬁnition of qualify-
ing subordinated debt and ensuring that subordinated debt is held at arm’s
length) and limiting the yield of qualifying subordinated debt are two addi-
tional steps the government should consider.
Does the Argentine regulatory system provide a model that other coun-
tries should adopt? We think the capital requirements, liquidity require-
ments, and BASIC system oﬀer an excellent set of blueprints for any coun-
try to consider if it is serious about fostering market discipline in banking.
At the same time, experience in developing and developed economies alike
has shown that a regulatory system is only as eﬀective as the political will
that underlies its enforcement. In many countries—notably Chile in 1982,
the United States in 1984, and Venezuela in 1991—de facto deposit insur-
ance was provided despite its de jure absence.
During the tequila crisis of 1995 in Argentina (as during the liberaliza-
tion of Estonia’s banks in 1991) the government chose to force insolvent
banks to close and permitted depositors in insolvent banks to lose a sig-
niﬁcant proportion of their deposits. The political commitment to low in-
ﬂation and reform of the banking system in Argentina in the wake of the
inﬂation and banking disasters of the earlier era set constraints on govern-
ment policy toward banks in the 1990s, limiting the possibility of large
bailout expenditures or other interventions in the banking system. The
ability to apply the Argentine approach successfully to other countries
likely depends on the existence of a similar political will backing real re-
form and limiting bailouts. Thus the challenges for reformers in emerging
market countries include not only the technical problem of how to design
an eﬀective regulatory system, but also the more diﬃcult problem of how
to create the political conditions that make such a system credible.
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Comment Douglas W. Diamond
Calomiris and Powell provide a very complete description and analysis of
the experience in the market-oriented bank regulatory scheme in Argen-
tina after 1992. They carefully describe the evolution of the system, its
great successes, and the surprises along the way. In addition to providing
their own analysis of recent data on Argentine banks, they outline the re-
sults of important earlier work. Given the importance of Argentina as the
most complete experiment with market-oriented bank regulation and su-
pervision,this complete and comprehensive presentation is recommended
reading for all concerned with contemporary bank regulation (and not just
in emerging markets).
The interpretation given to the experience is evenhanded. It is not self-
congratulatory and does not trumpet only one view of how the approach
worked or was supposed to work. I will provide my own summary of their
evidence and use it to evaluate the potential role for requiring issue of
subordinated debt.
The most important fact about the success of the entire approach was
that the Argentine banking system managed to survive the tequila shock
without initial deposit insurance or a domestic lender of last resort
(though with some international help). It appears that the currency board
limited the regulator’s ability to succumb to the temptation to bail out
banks and protect depositors. However, regulators clearly understood the
long-run beneﬁts of imposing losses. Some banks were allowed to fail.
Emerging Market Bank Regulators and Credible Discipline 191After the 1995 tequila crisis ended, the market discipline approach was ex-
panded, but some small safety net was also restored.
Information in Bank Runs during the Tequila Crisis
The cross section of bank runs, deposit losses, and failures during vari-
ous phases of the tequila crisis is of substantial interest because it provides
evidence about the information possessed by depositors. My discussion
relies on Schumacher (1996, 2000). Through most of the crisis, it was ex
ante low capital banks with poor performance that lost deposits and later
failed. The fact that it was not random banks that lost deposits is evidence
that some depositors have public information about banks. This, of course,
does not show that bank runs do not themselves partly cause banks to
increase their losses. Even if runs themselves impose losses on banks, how-
ever, this imposition of losses is not indiscriminate. There seems to have
been some information that neither regulators nor depositors had: Some
of the failures revealed surprise problems, such as fraud.
The crisis deepened and eventually became both a systemic run and a
currency run. During this period, runs became indiscriminate (the cross
section of severity among domestically owned banks did not depend on a
bank’se xa n t eﬁnancial condition). There was little the Argentine govern-
ment could do to stop it on its own. It needed the help of international
agencies. After the new International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and
Inter-American Development Bank agreements were reached, the indis-
criminate withdrawals stopped, but the runs at poorly performing banks
continued.
Regulatory Changes after the Crisis
After the crisis a very limited safety net was established. A limited (and
unfunded) deposit insurance for small deposits was introduced, without
bailing out losses ex post in failed banks. A new and limited framework
to merge banks with some government assistance was set up. In addition,
management of liquidity risk was improved. A clearer set of liquidity re-
quirements was imposed, including the use of foreign standby letters of
credit as a way to get contingent liquidity.
In addition to the small safety net, an improved regulatory system was
put into place: the BASIC system. I want to focus on the most novel part
of that system: the subordinated debt requirement.
The intent of the subordinated debt requirement (as well as the credit
rating requirement) was to provide veriﬁable information to avoid denia-
bility by regulators and possibly to provide new information to regulators.
At the same time it should increase bank disclosure of information when
banks attempt to sell debt or improve their credit rating. In addition, it is
possible that the subordinated debt requirement could commit regulators
to close banks that are risky and that it would attract outside monitoring
192 Charles W. Calomiris and Andrew Powellof banks. The experience in Argentina suggests that the commitment bene-
ﬁts may be overstated, and that the monitoring beneﬁts depend on the
endogenous amount of losses that regulators will impose on subordinated
debt holders when choosing the timing of closure.
Investor Commitment, Regulator Commitment, and Creating Liquidity
A regulator’s incentive to close banks diﬀers from that of investors and
depositors, but there is a common element to these decisions. If banks
make unique relationship loans, there is a problem with closing banks or
changing management to discipline the bank to take low risks and operate
eﬃciently. When there is relationship lending (or when capital markets do
not exist), and borrowers do not have other equally qualiﬁed lenders, there
are extra losses imposed if a bank is closed. This reduces the incentive
for investors or regulators to close poorly performing banks, reducing the
discipline that comes from the threat to close or change management. It
is possible, of course, that closure imposes trouble on relationship borrow-
ers as well. Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) analyze the ability of unin-
sured demand deposits to provide commitment to run and thus close the
bank whenever depositor losses are anticipated. This commitment can be
useful to force the imposition of the closure penalty that is painful to those
imposing it. Because of the ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served property rights of de-
mand depositors, they will rush to foreclose even when bank failure is not
in the collective interest of depositors. Other claims like capital (in particu-
lar, long-term subordinated debt) can be renegotiated and do not provide
this extra discipline. Diamond and Rajan view bank capital choice as a
trade-oﬀ between commitment and stability. Long-term subordinated debt
holders will not force ineﬃcient discipline; they may roll over the debt at
maturity or buy new issue.
When subordinated debt is closely held, it will provide even less disci-
pline. Closely held debt is even more easily renegotiated and could end up
being held by the owners of equity or other banks with business relations
with the issuer. It is interesting that the low compliance banks in Argentina
included banks that got capital from other Argentine banks. Even a rate
ceiling on newly issued subordinated debt, as suggested by Calomiris
(1999), may not work as intended if debt is rolled over by an old owner
who wishes not to alert regulators of the bank’s condition. Given the lack
of a bond market in Argentina, its experience may be diﬀerent from that
of more developed countries, but a private placement arrangement might
be the only option for smaller banks worldwide.
Did Subordinated Debt Commit Argentine Regulators?
In addition to the discipline imposed at the maturity of debt, there is
also a requirement of regular ﬂotation of new debt. Does this impose extra
discipline? If regulators close banks or provide other penalties to banks
Emerging Market Bank Regulators and Credible Discipline 193that do not meet this requirement, then it will provide added discipline.
However, because regulators will still make closure decisions and can ex-
tend the deadline, they may not choose to provide ex post ineﬃcient penal-
ties to banks. This is particularly true when many banks cannot issue new
subordinated debt on attractive terms. Because the Argentine requirement
became eﬀective after the East Asian crisis, it is not surprising that the
regulation was not enforced immediately. More generally, if relationship
lending is present and banks are important to lending, regulators will be
concerned with the ﬂow of credit in the economy. Even international au-
thorities such as the IMF could be less inclined to force bank closure in a
crisis situation, although they should be tougher than most domestic regu-
lators.
This may illustrate a more general point. Commitment to close or pun-
ish banks comes from political will and regulatory preferences, when regu-
lators retain discretion not to carry through with the penalty. Commit-
ments to issue subordinated debt may only provide veriﬁable information
that regulators did not enforce their own rules. Although this can provide
some commitment, it is not just due to the precise nature of the debt con-
tract, such as its priority. Changing the rules can make more information
public, improving transparency, or signal “tough” intent. There is a limit
on the amount of market discipline a regulatory system can provide.
The currency board already limits government discretion, which means
that some bailouts that require resources would require international help.
This by itself provides real commitment to local regulators. However, the
timing of closure and implied losses still depend on regulatory action. In
this setting, the transparency eﬀect of the BASIC system can be eﬀective.
Calomiris and Powell’s results suggest that this transparency is very bene-
ﬁcial in helping to make clear to outsiders that there is a given amount of
commitment to discipline banks. It is less clear that it adds more commit-
ment than already exists.
References
Calomiris, Charles W. 1999. Building an Incentive-Compatible Safety Net. Journal
of Banking and Finance 23 (October): 1499–1519.
Diamond, Douglas W., and Raghuram G. Rajan. 2000. A theory of bank capital.
Journal of Finance 60 (December): 2431–65.
———. 2001. Liquidity risk, liquidity creation and ﬁnancial fragility: A theory of
banking. Journal of Political Economy 109 (April): 287–327.
Schumacher, Liliana. 1996. Bubble or depositors’ discipline: A study of the Argen-
tine banking panic, December 1994–May 1995. Ph.D. diss., University of
Chicago.
———. 2000. Bank runs and currency run in a system without a safety net: Ar-
gentina and the “tequila” shock. Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (August):
257–77.
194 Charles W. Calomiris and Andrew PowellDiscussion Summary
Ben Bernanke began the general discussion by suggesting that in trying to
think about generalizations of the Argentine experience, it is important to
consider the role of the currency board. He noted that one needs a substi-
tute for the lender of last resort under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
Gerard Caprio cited the Mexican experience, noting that ﬁrms as deposi-
tors acted as a source of market discipline because of the reliance on trade
credit lines. He also wondered about the relationship between credit deriv-
atives and a subordinated debt regime. Finally, he asked if the Argentine
model could be exported. He expressed hope that hyperinﬂation is not a
necessary condition.
James Barth pointed out that prompt corrective action was in place in
the 1970s for savings and loans and that this highlights the key role of
political will. Martin Feldstein raised the issue of the importance of foreign
banks in Argentina as a safe haven. He wondered why they have not at-
tracted even more deposits. Michael Dooley noted that with dollar denomi-
nated loans and with two currencies in the system, banks faced spread
risk that could be avoided with dollarization.
Eric Rosengren observed that of the three bank failures, two have invest-
ment grade ratings, and four of the ﬁve banks that were resolved were also
investment grade. External debt ratings appear to be poor predictors of
banks. He asked if subordinated debt was a better predictor of bank risk.
He also asked about the underwriting and associated costs of issuing sub-
ordinated debt.
Andrew Powell responded to Bernanke by noting that the Central Bank
of Argentina has a systemic liquidity policy. He noted that this mitigates
the need for a lender of last resort, and that the run to dollars limits the
beneﬁts of a lender of last resort. In response to Caprio, he noted that
there was some evidence of even insured depositors leaving banks that
subsequently failed. He observed that even though the deposit insurance
was ex post credible, the time to resolution may be long and uncertain. He
also noted that foreign banks do, in fact, have almost 70 percent of private
deposits, but that there are important regional domestic banks in some
sectors.
In response to Dooley, Powell noted that dollarization had been consid-
ered. He noted that banks were fairly well matched in terms of their peso-
dollar books. He noted that there are some short-term peso loans such as
overdraft protection and personal loans, but that there were peso deposits
as well.
He observed that local rating agencies were competing and that ratings
may have had low predictive power, but that now there are only four inter-
national-based accredited rating agencies. He conceded that although the
Argentine regulatory rating system (CAMELS) outperformed the rating
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he noted that the cost of issuing subordinated debt varies by type of issu-
ance and that deals with correspondents may be cheaper.
Also in response to Caprio, Charles Calomiris noted that in Mexico
good and bad banks had diﬀerent rates for insured deposits as well. He
pointed out that banks paying higher rates had little demand deposits. He
suggested that it would be good to look at the composition of deposits and
debt. He agreed with Feldstein that the presence of foreign banks is a ma-
jor source of market discipline, but the operating costs for foreign banks
can be very high. He agreed that reliance on public ratings is risky. Lastly,
he pointed out that Argentina has $80 billion of deposits, so it may be
hard to draw lessons for smaller developing economies from the Argen-
tine experience.
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